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I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the end of the Cold War, democracy seems to be in bad
shape these days. In fact, there has been a modest boom in books and
commentary proclaiming either the inadequacy of democracy or its
*
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Kraus, Bob Scott, Peter Swire, Steven Walt, and G.E. White for their ideas and suggestions.
Early versions of this Essay were presented at the University of Cincinnati Law School and as
part of the University of Tennessee's Centripetal Lectures series. I would like to thank Tom
Eisele, Michael Solimine, and Joseph Tomain of the University of Cincinnati, as well as
evolutionary biologist John Gittleman and political scientist Otis Stephens of the University of
Tennessee for helpful comments at those presentations. Rob Merges, Steven Walt, Heidi
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useful insights. Brooks Smith, Brannon Denning, and Micaela Burnham provided excellent
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In spite of all of this high quality intellectual input, this Essay undoubtedly contains errors and
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imminent demise. According to at least one commentator, we face the
possibility that American democracy will turn out to be a failure.1
Much has also been made of the gloomy assessments of American
democracy contained in recent books by Christopher Lasch and Jean
Bethke Elshtain.2 Such gloom seems a natural follow-on to the generally negative evaluations of democracy as a decision-making device
provided by the works of decision theorists such as Kenneth Arrow,3
and, more recently, by public choice theorists. 4 It has even been suggested that democracy may be a victim of its own success: too much
democracy, we are warned, may be the death of America as a vibrant
5
and productive society.
I would be the last to argue that this concern is entirely misplaced. As I have suggested elsewhere, there are real problems with
the way our society addresses and resolves important issues. Those
problems undoubtedly incorporate the shortcomings of democracy (at
least as it is currently practiced) in some ways. 6 But I also believe
that things may not be quite as bad as pictured, for some surprising
reasons. In short, I believe that some of the characteristics of democracy that are often portrayed as shortcomings may actually be
strengths. If properly appreciated, these characteristics may even be
seen as protections against the very kinds of problems that today's
commentators describe. Furthermore, a proper understanding of the
role of democracy in our constitutional system suggests that many of
the structural reforms being urged by some who complain about special interest dominance are likely to make things worse, rather than
better.

See John Omcinski, Americans Must Face Possibility Democracy Might Fail Here,
1.
Gannett News Service (January 1, 1995) ("American democracy, we suddenly are realizing, is
quite capable of failing"). See also Robert J. Samuelson, The Public Trust: Handle With Care,
Washington Post A15 (January 4, 1995).
2.
Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy (W.W.
Norton, 1995); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Democracy on Trial (Basic Books, 1995). Popular reviews
of these books capture the gloom in their titles. See, for example, John Gray, Does Democracy
Have a Future? New York Times Book Review 1 (January 22, 1995); Carlin Romano, Democracy
EndangeredBy a Self-Centered Population,Philadelphia Inquirer N3 (January 15, 1995).
3.
See note 34 and accompanying text.
4.
Id.
5.
See, for example, Jonathan Rauch, Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American
Government (Times Books, 1994); Robert Wright, Hyper Democracy, Time 14 (January 23,
1995).
6.
See generally Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1333, 1346-48 (1992) (criticizing the debasing of constitutional discourse by politics); Glenn
H. Reynolds, Up in Arms About a Revolting Movement, Chicago Tribune 11 (January 30, 1995)
(describing the consequences of the growing distrust of America's political establishment).
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To explore this idea, I have chosen as an analogy or metaphor
another widely criticized and misunderstood institution-sex. In
short, some discoveries resulting from the application of complexity
theory 7 to the question of evolutionary fitness among biological systems have important implications for our discussion of the fitness of
the body politic. Both kinds of systems face a similar problem-maintaining a balance between adaptability and stability on the one hand,
while resisting parasitism on the other. In essence, democracy can be
viewed as serving the same function in political systems that sex
serves for biological systems-enhancing resistance to parasites. As
it turns out, this approach raises important questions regarding the
merits of many proposals for fixing current democracy through, for
example, "electronic town meetings," in which citizens vote directly on
issues, or term limits for elected officials.
This Essay will first summarize some contemporary thinking
about the role of sex in evolutionary biology. Next, it will briefly outline some reasons why the conclusions reached by evolutionary

7.
This Essay, like my earlier piece Chaos and the Court, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 110 (1991),
draws on my ongoing interest in applying what is variously called "complexity theory," "chaos
theory," or "dynamic systems theory" to the complex, dynamic, and sometimes chaotic behavior
of legal and political institutions. For more on these topics in a legal context, see generally J.B.
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigmfor the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: Wake-Up
Call for Legal Reductionism and the Administrative State, 45 Duke L. J. (forthcoming 1996);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of
the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546 (1994); Thomas Earl Geu,
The Tao of Jurisprudence: Brain Science, Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 933
(1994); Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox,35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 329
(1993); Andrew W. Hayes, An Introductionto Chaos and Law, 60 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 751 (1992);
Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos (Macmillan, 1992); M. Mitchell Waldrop,
Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (Simon & Schuster, 1992).
As these sources indicate, a staple of complexity theory is that its approaches apply to all
kinds of complex dynamic systems, meaning that it is worth considering in the context of social
or legal institutions. Indeed, as I finished writing this Essay, I discovered that others are calling for this kind of analysis--or, at any rate, for the kind of analysis toward which this Essay
represents a very tentative first step. See Kenneth Arrow and Neil Smelser, Letters, 267
Science 1618 (1995) (calling for the application of evolutionary theory to economics and social
behavior and calling the resulting science "bio-psycho-social"). According to Smelser, the new
field "will synthesize ingredients from molecular biology, genetics, and neurosciences on the one
hand and from the behavioral and social sciences on the other." Id. I particularly agree with
Arrow that "[e]volutionary theory is a point of view rather than a complete theory such as has
been the desideratum of economists" (and, I might add, some constitutional theorists). Id.
Nonetheless, I believe that it is a valuable point of view. As Richard Feynman wrote in a very
different context: "There is a pleasure in recognizing old things from a new point of view. Also,
there are problems for which the new point of view offers a distinct advantage." Richard
Feynman, Space-Time Approach to Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics, 20 Rev. Modern Phys.
367 (1948) (quoted in James Gleick, Genius: The Life and Science of Richard Feynman 249
(Vintage Books, 1993)).
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biologists regarding the advantages of sexual reproduction are likely
to be applicable to complex dynamic systems that are not biological,
including political systems. It will then apply this construct to
analyze the outcomes of two recent Supreme Court cases. It will
conclude with some observations about what the similar roles of sex
and democracy can tell us regarding our American constitutional
system, including various proposals for its reform.
II. SEX AND EVOLUTION

As should be obvious by now, the "sex' that I am talking about
is not the intimate, individual experience of sexual intercourse, but is
rather the overall biological phenomenon of sexual reproduction. In
other words, I mean the process of reproducing by intermingling the
genes of two individuals to produce a third unique individual possessing some attributes from each parent in a combination that is new. 8 A
more accurate (though less catchy) title for this piece would thus have
been "Is Democracy Like Sexual Reproduction?," for that is what I am
really talking about.
As a means of reproduction, sex seems to have many drawbacks compared to asexual methods such as fission or budding. An
organism that reproduces asexually does not have to waste time or
energy in a (possibly futile) search for a mate. It is not at risk for
sexually-transmitted disease, it need not take part in combat with
other members of its species for the privilege of mating, and it need
not accept a paltry fifty percent (average) pass-on rate for its genes.
With asexual reproduction, you 'Just do it." With little muss or fuss,
you can produce a perfect copy of yourself-not just a chip off the old
block, but its exact duplicate, a clone. Furthermore, an asexual organism that survives to reproduce is, by definition, a successful collection of genes, one that presumably will be successful again when copied. Sexual reproduction, on the other hand, takes two perfectly good
sets of genes and mixes them up to create an entirely new combination that may or may not be as good as its parents. 9

8.
See, for example, Neil A. Campbell, Biology 245 (Benjamin/Cummings, 3d ed. 1993)
("Compared to asexual reproduction, sexual reproduction usually results in greater variation;
two parents give rise to offspring that have unique combinations of genes inherited from both
parents. In contrast to a clone, offspring of sexual reproduction vary genetically from their
siblings and both parents'.
9.
Id.
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With all of these advantages, it would seem that asexual reproduction should be the only game in town. Why would any species
go to the trouble to evolve sexually, when it is such a clumsy and
inefficient means of passing on genes? As two scientists put it, "Isn't
all the effort involved in finding a mate, chemically attracting it, and
compromising with it long enough for sexual interchange more
complex than simple one-parent reproduction? 1o This has been a
leading question for some time, one that evolutionary biologists (most
of them, anyway) now believe that they have answered.
For sex is in fact pervasive, and there must be some good reason. That is, there must be compensating advantages to sex that offset its rather obvious disadvantages. The answer that evolutionary
biologists have developed is that sex offers the primary advantage of
increasing resistance to parasites.
The role of sex in increasing resistance to parasites was suggested as long ago as 1932 by the eminent biologist J.B.S. Haldane,
but for many years no one followed up on his idea. According to
Haldane, evolutionists were too caught up in notions of predators and
prey. Just because it is easy to see wolves chasing and eating sheep
does not mean that avoidance of wolves is the most important part of
sheep fitness. (Indeed, even a passing acquaintance with sheep
should suggest that if wolf-resistance were the key to sheep survival,
sheep would be extinct by now.) Instead, Haldane suggested the
likelihood that "[olne of the principal characters possessing survival
value is immunity to disease.""
For a long time, no one paid much attention to this idea, even
though Haldane repeated it in 1949. 'The struggle against disease,
and particularly infectious disease, has been a very influential agent,"
he argued, and "some of its results have been rather unlike those of
the struggle against natural forces, hunger, and predators, or with
members of the same species. ' ' 12 His point was that predators, which
typically breed far more slowly than prey, were poorly suited to controlling numbers of prey. On the other hand, as species became more
crowded, parasitism became more important: "I believe that the den-

10. Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan, Mystery Dance: On the Evolution of Human
Sexuality 194 (Summit Books, 1991).
11. Quoted in Sahotra Sarkar, Thinking of Biology: Sex, Disease and EvolutionVariationson a Theme from J.B.S. Haldane,42 BioScience 448,448 (1992).
12. J.B.S. Haldane, Disease and Evolution, 19 La Ricerca Scientifica 1, 2-3 (1949)
(translated and quoted in Sarkar, 42 BioScience at 448 (cited in note 11)).
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sity-dependent limiting factor is more often a parasite whose inci13
dence is disproportionately raised by overcrowding."'
The problem was made worse by the fact that parasites typically can mutate faster than their hosts, becoming better adapted to
overcoming host defenses over time. In this "arms race" host species
are at a disadvantage. Haldane suggested that the best response to
these problems of parasitism was for organisms to become moving
targets. In short, the best move for individuals was to become as
biochemically unique as possible-and a population that allowed its
members to become biochemically diverse in this fashion was more
resistant to parasites as a result. In a remark that one writer
describes as "remarkably prescient,"'14 Haldane suggested that:
[E]very species of mammal and bird so far investigated has shown a quite surprising diversity revealed by serological tests. The antigens concerned seem to
be proteins to which polysaccharide groups are attached. We do not know their
functions in the organisms, though some of them seem to be part of the structure of cell membranes. I wish to suggest that they may play a part in disease
resistance, a particular race of bacteria or virus being adapted to individuals of
a certain range of biochemical constitution, while those of other constitutions
are relatively resistant. 15

Seen in this light, the chief flaw of sexual reproduction-that it
is constantly mixing up perfectly good gene patterns to produce new
With sex keeping the population of
ones-becomes a virtue.
individuals in a species diverse and constantly shifting, parasites (a
term that encompasses everything from viruses and bacteria all the
way up to more complex organisms like tapeworms) find it more
difficult to adapt. In a species composed of clones, a parasite that is
well adapted to any individual member is well adapted to all, allowing
infection to sweep through the population like wildfire. On the other
hand, a parasite that is well adapted to one individual in a diverse,
sexually reproducing population may or may not be adapted to others.
As parasites try to adapt to their hosts, the hosts constantly shift
characteristics, so that the biochemical and physical points of entry
relied on by the parasites are in constant flux. Each new generation
brings about entirely new combinations. Thus, even though parasites
are good at adapting to their hosts, this "moving target" approach
makes it hard for parasites to adapt especially well to a species that
reproduces sexually.

13.
14.
15.

Id. at4.
Sarkar, 42 BioScience at 449 (cited in note 11).
Haldane, 19 La Ricerca Scientifica at 6 (cited in note 12).
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For that matter, another apparent flaw-that sexual reproduction is a lot more trouble-may also be a virtue. Since mating and
courtship are complex and time-consuming, individuals who are susceptible to parasites (and thus weaker, slower, or otherwise less
healthy) are less likely to be successful at mating. This means that
genes for parasite-resistance, once randomly created, are more likely
to be passed on.
Haldane's theory has become quite popular in the past few
years, finding support in both empirical research and computer modeling. It was addressed by John Maynard Smith in The Evolution of
Sex,16 and the theory has now attained the status of front-runner in
the evolutionary biology community's race to explain the reasons for
sex.17 As William Hamilton writes:
The decade that is witnessing the emergence of a new, lethal, sexually transmitted disease may seem a bad one in which to be supporting a theory that sex
is life's main adaptation to combat disease. But such a theory exists, and it
seems to me the best contender in a great puzzle.18

For our purposes, it does not really matter whether the theory
that resistance to parasitism is "the" reason why sex developed and
persists is correct. The important part is that pretty much everyone
agrees that sex produces resistance to parasites by creating diversity
in the host population. The "moving target" approach to parasite
resistance is thus widely accepted on its own grounds.
All of this is interesting in itself, but what is particularly interesting is the idea that the same kinds of dynamics may be applicable in another area altogether. One key political problem today is the
growth of "special interest" power in our society, and the role of de-

16.

John Maynard Smith, The Evolution of Sex (Cambridge, 1978). For more on this view

of sex and parasite resistance, see generally John Maynard Smith, Evolutionary Genetics
(Oxford, 1989); John Maynard Smith, Why Sex?, in John Maynard Smith, ed., Games, Sex, and
Evolution (Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1988).
17. For an excellent popular account of the theory and its status, see Having Sex to Avoid
Disease,The Economist 79 (April 13, 1991).
18. William Donald Hamilton, Sex and Disease, in Robert Bellig and George Stevens, eds.,
The Evolution of Sex 65 (Harper & Row, 1988). For more on this view of sex and parasite
resistance, see generally William Donald Hamilton, Robert Axelrod, and Reiko Tanese, Sexual
Reproductionas an Adaptationto Resist Parasites:A Review, 87 Proceedings, National Academy
of Sciences 3566 (1990); George Bell, The Masterpieceof Nature: The Evolution and Genetics of
Sexuality (U. Cal., 1982); William Donald Hamilton, Sex Versus Non-sex Versus Parasite,35
Oikos 282 (1980). For a discussion of host-parasite interactions in general, see Eric R. Pianka,
EvolutionaryEcology 235-48 (Harper & Row, 3d ed. 1983).
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mocracy as either cause or cure for that problem. The "moving target"
approach has much to offer our understanding in this field.
III. DEMOCRACY AND ITS PARASITES
At the beginning of this Essay, I mentioned popular criticisms
of democracy today. One major criticism of democracy is that it is
open to domination by special interests. In his influential book The
Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and
Social Rigidities,19 economist Mancur Olson argues that a peculiar
hazard of democracies is the formation of special-interest lobbies that
use the democratic process to redistribute wealth from society as a
whole to themselves. According to Olson, such groups inevitably gain
power, creating a web of special interests that tends to convert government from a responsive and generally wealth-enhancing institution into an institution paralyzed by the ability of minorities to frus20
trate change and bled dry by the demands of special interest groups.
More recently, Jonathan Rauch has given a name to this phenomenon, which he calls 'Demosclerosis."1 According to Rauch, the
growth of interest group domination of politics is the major threat to
American society today. As Rauch notes, although democracies have
done well in competition with dictatorships, their real problem lies
in the democratic public's tendency to form ever more groups clamoring for
ever more goodies and perks and then defending them to the death. Free and
stable societies, it seems, tend to drift toward economic cannibalism and governmental calcification, unless they make a positive effort to fight the current.
serious single challenge to the
Demosclerosis may now represent the most
22
long-term vitality of democratic government.

These special interest groups may be characterized as the
parasites of the body politic. In fact, Rauch uses this very term, describing the growth of special interest legislation and the entities that

19. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and
Social Rigidities (Yale U., 1982). For a clear and insightful review of Olson's work see Peter H.
Schuck, The Politics ofEconomic Growth, 2 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 359 (1984).
20. Olson, Rise and Decline at 41-47 (cited in note 19).
21. Rauch, Demosclerosis at 17 (cited in note 5) ("By definition, government's power to
solve problems comes from its ability to reassign resources, whether by taxing, spending,
regulating, or simply passing laws. But that very ability energized countless investors and
entrepreneurs and ordinary Americans to go digging for gold by lobbying government.... As it
grows, the steady accumulation of subsidies and benefits, each defended in perpetuity by a
professional interest group calcifies government").
22. Id. at 19-20.
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it supports as the "Parasite Economy.23 The growth of special interest groups not only does harm in itself, it also forces others to respond
in kind. As Rauch puts it:
In the economy, as in nature, a parasite is set apart from a mere freeloader by
its ability to force its target to fend it off. This is the sense in which transferseekers are, not so loosely speaking, parasitic: they are not only unproductive
themselves, they also force otherpeople to be unproductive.... A bad stockbroker or a pesky real-estate agent can take your money if you do hire him, but
24
only a transfer-seeker can take your money if you don't hire him.

Thus, political parasites are a double danger: they not only
pursue their own self-interested agenda, but also force others into a
political "arms race" to protect their own interests. "What is peculiar
about the parasite economy, then, is its ability to suck in resources
that people would rather invest elsewhere. Activism on one side
draws counteractivism on another.25 Of course, efforts at the political
redistribution of wealth make society poorer, not richer.26 To the
extent that people are investing in lobbyists, lawyers, and public
relations firms instead of research and development, for example,
they are foregoing investments that might benefit society as a whole.
Furthermore, to the extent that special interest groups succeed in
getting self-serving laws and regulations enacted, they are taking
money out of other citizens' pockets. Special interest groups provide
nothing of value in return and quite possibly block new innovations
that might benefit society as a whole but that would threaten their
own interests.27
It thus seems fair to say that, just as the fitness of an organism has a lot to do with its ability to resist biological parasites, the
"fitness" of a political system stems in no small part from its ability to
resist these political parasites. The easier it is for special interest
groups to get a foothold, and the more points of entry there are for
those seeking transfer payments and laws against competition, the
more vulnerable a given system is to special interest domination.
Inversely, the harder it is for special interest groups to achieve and

23. Id. at 64-97 (chapter entitled'The Parasite Economy").
24. Id. at 72-73.
25. Id. at 75.
26. Olson, Rise and Decline at 58-69 (cited in note 19).
27. One example given by Rauch is an effort by bicycle messengers to set legal limits on
the use of fax machines, which is a more efficient method of delivering messages. Rauch,
Demosclerosis at 28-31 (cited in note 5).
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maintain control over the machinery of government, and the fewer
points of entry there are for those seeking self-serving laws and regulation, the less likely a system of government is to be parasitized.28
In many ways, there is nothing new about these arguments.
The Framers of our Constitution were certainly aware of the dangers
of special interests (what they called "faction"29). They crafted our
30
system of government with an eye toward resisting such pressures.
There is even some suggestion that they regarded electoral turnover
as providing protection against corruption. 31 The use of governmental
power to transfer wealth at the behest of special interests was viewed
with considerable suspicion, not only by the Framers, but by later
32
constitutional theorists such as Justice Joseph Story.
Nonetheless, this Essay's perspective is a somewhat unusual
one today. At least since World War II, the notion that government
should be resistant to special interest pressures has been in eclipse.
Instead, political thinkers have generally viewed responsiveness to
special interest pressures as being emblematic of democracy 33 Such a
view, however, runs counter to a proper understanding of the role
democracy plays in our system of government. This point will be
addressed in the next Part of this Essay.

28. One might stretch the metaphor even further. Just as the courtship behavior required
by sex favors robust, parasite-resistant individuals over those who have been weakened by

parasite infestation, so the limitations imposed by special interest groups on political party
flexibility may limit the ability to woo voters. A party that is too thoroughly controlled by
special interest groups may find it difficult to change its positions even when it is clear that the
voters want something different. Over time, voters may favor parties that are less dominated
by such groups. Therefore, democracy may have anti-parasitic effects at the party level as well.
29. See Federalist 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 77-84
(Mentor, 1961) (describing the problem of "faction").
30. See id. (discussing the Constitution's structural means for dealing with the problem of
"factions" through federalism).
31. See, for example, Federalist 63 (Madison), in Rossiter, The FederalistPapers388 (cited
in note 29) (describing the difficulty in corrupting the Senate by noting that "the periodical
change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body").
32. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, in Ronald
Rotunda and John Nowak, eds., Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 712,
510-11 (Carolina Academic Press, 1987) (arguing that the "nature of republican and free governments" may limit legislative power to, among other things, "take the property of A. and transfer
it to B. by a mere legislative act").
33. See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The PoliticalSeduction
of the Law 257-58 (Macmillan, 1990). Indeed, Bork goes further than most theorists of this
stripe by declaring that courts have no business denying a majority, or even "an intense and
politically influential minority," the opportunity to effect its selfish political will. Id. at 227.
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IV. PARASITE RESISTANCE

Another major criticism of democracy is that it does not produce rational decisions. Beginning with the work of Kenneth Arrow,
and continuing with the work of some public choice writers, decision
theorists have argued that democratic decisionmaking is inherently
irrational, even chaotic. 34 Because of a combination of the electorate's
"rational ignorance 5 and the inherent instability of coalitions needed
to produce a majority, the results of democratic decisionmaking are as
likely to be determined by virtually random factors, such as the order
in which decisions are made, as by any underlying sense of rationality.36

Furthermore, on those rare occasions when voters in fact think

through issues, they are likely to be wrong. Their decisions are as
likely to be swayed by passion and ideology as by any rational understanding of the merits. 37
Instead of arguing with these criticisms, which are rather well
established, I intend to take them as true. In short, my argument is
that these "flaws" of democracy as a decision-making device may turn
out to be virtues when democracy is properly employed, virtues that
have the effect-because of their "randomness" or at least unpredictability-of increasing the political system's resistance to special interest domination over the long term.
To understand this point, think back to the criticisms of sexual
reproduction. If sex is seen merely as a means of passing on genes, it
is pretty obviously a loser. Sexually reproducing organisms pass on
only half of their genes, unlike asexual organisms which pass on all of
them. Furthermore, in sexual reproduction, genes are more or less
34. See, for example, Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 46-60 (John
Wiley & Sons, 2d ed. 1963); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
285-95 (U. Mich., 1965). For more modern treatments of the subject, see Daniel A. Farber and
Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 32-62 (U. Chicago, 1991);
Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and PoliticalTheory (Cambridge U., 1986); William H. Riker,
LiberalismAgainst Populism 21-40 (W. H. Freeman, 1982).
35. "Rational ignorance" exists when voters conclude that their stake in the outcome of a
question, multiplied by the probability that their vote will make a difference, is too small to
justify expending the effort to become informed. Olson, Rise and Decline at 26-27 (cited in note
19).

36.

Id.

37. See, for example, Alan Rosenthal, Sloppy Democracy, 20 State Gov. News 19, 19
(January 1995) (noting that "the contemporary legislature... may be too responsive"); Charles
L. Black, Jr., The Humane Imagination 116-17 (Ox Bow, 1986) (I think it is an insult to the
intelligence of the American people to flatter them with the suggestion that politics, lawmaking,
and national policy formation do not call for expertness, professionalism, and the commitment of
full time. These jobs are as complicated as law or medicine").
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randomly combined, meaning that the new combination may or may
not be as good as either parent. Finally, there is a lot of mess and
fuss involved with sexual reproduction: finding a mate and so on.
But these flaws of sexual reproduction-flaws, that is, when the system is viewed solely as a means of passing on genes-turn out to be
virtues when the view is widened to include the problem of dealing
with parasites.
Similarly, most criticisms of democracy have to do with its
efficacy as a means of making decisions. Because intelligence is not
additive (as anyone who has ever served on a committee can attest),
groups of people do not necessarily make better decisions than do
individuals. Furthermore, the decisions that groups make often turn
out to be worse, or at least less consistent and rational, than decisions
made by individuals. Democracy is messy, which is why diplomats
notoriously prefer to deal with autocracies than with democracies. It
is easy to predict what a dictator will do most of the time. Elected
politicians, on the other hand, must answer to the ever-changing
whims of the voters or be replaced by new figures with whom the
diplomat must learn to deal.
But this is precisely the advantage of being a democracy, at
least in a world where one must deal with special interest "parasites."
Because democratic politicians have to answer to the changing mood
of the voters, their actions are not always predictable. Furthermore,
because politicians are frequently replaced by the voters, even the
coziest relationships are liable to disruption. Just as the randomizing
factor of sex creates a "moving target" for parasites, preventing them
from becoming too well adapted to their hosts, so the randomizing
factor of democratic politics creates a "moving target" for special
interests, keeping their relationships with lawmakers from being too
comfortable or mutually beneficial.
There is some evidence that things really do work this way in
practice. On the broad scale, parasitism is so widespread that one
scientist has suggested the following as a universal law: "All successful systems attract parasites.38 This maxim is not limited to
purely biological systems.
In computer simulations, known as
"artificial life," parasites spontaneously evolve, taking advantage of
the fact that it is easier to take from others than to do the work oneself.39 The widespread use of the term "parasite" to refer to special
38. Thomas Ray, quoted in Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The Rise of Neo-Biological
Civilization 289 (Addison-Wesley, 1994).
39. Probably the best-known such simulation is Thomas Ray's program, "Tierra," which
spontaneously evolved parasitic entities in short order. Ray's work is described at length in Out

1995]

DEMOCRACY LIKE SEX

1647

interest groups certainly suggests the validity of such an analogy
between the biological and the political world.
Furthermore, within the political world, reshuffling things
does seem to set the parasites back. The last two elections, which
replaced a Republican-dominated presidency with a Democratic
President, and which replaced a Democratic-dominated Congress with
a Republican majority, seem to have thoroughly upset the established
special-interest applecart. Although the ultimate impact of these
changes is uncertain, there seems to be no question that special
interest groups are feeling much less comfortable in their relationship
with government agencies and officials than they did before these
changes. 40 It also seems to be the case that state governments-which
were substantially insulated from democratic turnover prior to the
Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions of the 1960s4--have
of Control, id. at 283-90. For other descriptions of Ray's work, see generally Diana Mahoney,
Artificial Life
Organisms and Systems Created in the Computer Exhibit Behaviors
Characteristicof NaturalEvolution, Computer Graphics World 37 (February 1993); M. Mitchell
Waldrop, Artificial Life's Rich Harvest: Computer Simulations of Dynamics of Living Things,
257 Science 1040 (1992) (describing both Thomas Ray's "ierra" model and its spontaneous
evolution of parasites).
40. See, for example, Michael Weisskopf, Congressional Democrats Aren't the Only
Bewildered Ones: Lobbyists Are Scrambling to Keep Up With-and Prevent-Changes,
Washington Post Nat'l. Weekly 21 (Nov. 28-Dec. 4, 1994):
Morgan Stanley & Co. is as Republican-leaning as any Wall Street firm. But when it
comes to the new ruling party's plans for reorganizing the House, the financial giant
prefers the old order.... The Republican takeover has necessitated improvisation by
Morgan Stanley and other special interests facing major changes in the way they do
business and the time-tested relationships they have cultivated with the lawmakers who
govern their industries.
Id.
When Bill Clinton was elected President in 1992, lobby groups accustomed to dealing with
Republican Presidents faced similar problems. See, for example, Karen Riley, Clinton Victory
Expected to Keep Lobbyists Busy, Washington Times C1 (November 13, 1992) (reporting that
"Republican [lobbying] companies are still moving to 'inoculate' themselves by adding
Democrats to their firms'; Lew Sichelman, Lobbyists Must Adjust to a New Congress, Chicago
Tribune Home Guide 3 (November 14, 1992).
An amusing testimonial to the problems created by political turnover can be found by paging
through almost any industry trade publication just after an election. See, for example, Stephen
Lodge, How to Handlethe New Congress, Candy Industry 18 (January 1993) (advising members,
among other things, to "send your product for festivities on Capitol Hill.... What better way to
establish a good relationship with your legislator than to send along some goodies"). No further
comment is needed.
41. See, for example, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that Tennessee voters
had a valid cause of action, under the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause,
against the state for its failure to reapportion seats in the Tennessee General Assembly);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires substantially equal legislative representation for all citizens in a state, and upholding a district
court decision ordering temporary reapportionment of the Alabama legislature). See also
Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America 14 (Yale U., 1981) (describing the way in which
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become significantly less dominated by special interests, and far more
42
innovative and effective since that time.
Therefore, one virtue of democracy, wholly apart from its ability to make good decisions, is that it disrupts the sort of cozy backscratching relationships between politicians and interest groups that
favor special interest parasitism. The flaws of democracy as a means
of making decisions-unpredictability, irrationality, and inconsistency-may actually further this effect. Note, however, that this
conclusion does not mean that more democracy is inherently good,
and less democracy inherently bad-it simply means that where democracy is properly employed, criticisms of its very real failings either
miss the point entirely, or must be weighed against this very real
advantage. These concerns will be addressed in the next Part.
V. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND THE PROPER PLACE OF
DEMOCRACY
If democracy helps protect against the dominance of special
interest parasites by constantly reshuffling their targets, and if special interest parasitism is, as many argue, one of the key problems
facing our system of government today, then one obvious solution
would seem to be more democracy. Referenda, "electronic town meetings" producing instant plebiscites on any issue, and increased access
by constituents to their representatives would all seem to be unalloyed goods in this view. But such is not the case.
The anti-parasitic role of democracy that I am outlining is,
after all, rather narrow. It does not have to do with making decisions
(at which democracy is, by hypothesis, not superior), but rather with
selecting decisionmakers. The way that democracy makes the political system more resistant to special interests is by mixing up the part
that those interests target: the government. A change in party control, whether in Congress or the White House, or even just a substantial influx of new members of Congress, obliterates an entire constel-

entrenched elites in state government frustrated political change prior to Supreme-Courtordered reapportionment).
42. See, for example, David Osborne, Laboratories of Democracy (Harvard Business
School, 1990) (describing innovation by state governments after 1965); Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, The Question of State Governmental Capability 364 (1985)
(stating that as a result of changes made in the mid-1960s through the 1970s, "states, in formal
representational policymaking and implementation terms at least, are more representative,
more responsive, more activist and more professional in their operations than they have ever
been'9.
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lation of relationships and entry points, leaving special interests
scrambling to catch up.
Thus, "more democracy" only plays an anti-parasitic role when
it is aimed at expanding the role of democracy in selecting decisionmakers. When it aims at expanding the ability of constituents to
influence the decisions that those elected officials will make, a more
democratic approach may actually make things worse. After all, it is
primarily special interests-parasites-who will make use of those
new points of contact.
Nor does direct popular decisionmaking serve the same antiparasitic role. Although plebiscitary democracy might serve to reduce
the influence of minority special interests (though this is far from
certain), it no longer turns the vice of inconsistency into the virtue of
a "moving target" of decisionmaker turnover. Instead, it replaces the
decisionmakers entirely. In a representative government, decisions
are made by democratically elected officials, but (because of
legislative rules, party discipline, and individual conscience) not
necessarily in a democratic fashion. Thus, the studied disadvantages
of democratic decisionmaking do not apply, and the dangers of special
interest parasitism are reduced. 4s A society in which all governmental
decisions were made by an electronic mail ballot following a televised
electronic town meeting, on the other hand, would face all the
disadvantages of democratic decisionmaking without the offsetting
44
advantages already discussed.
Indeed, the kind of plebiscitary electronic democracy that some
have trumpeted as a solution to special-interest dominance would
probably constitute a move from the frying pan into the fire. Our
constitutional system, after all, was designed to protect against the
twin dangers of majority and minority tyranny. The Framers' conception of "faction" took account of both dangers. A move to direct
democracy might reduce the danger of minority tyranny (though only
under ideal conditions), but in so doing, it would instead expose us to

43. Nor does this structure disempower the voters in a meaningful sense. As Charles
Black says:
[T]he need for specialists does not contradict the need for participation by the people.
The people under the present system have to judge records, positions and character, and
they have to make their wants and beliefs known.
Black, The Humane Imaginationat 117 (cited in note 37).
44. Furthermore, such a society would remain free of "special interest" domination only so
long as all or nearly all of its citizens participated in decisionmaking, something unlikely to take
place for long.
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the dangers of majority tyranny. Plebiscitary democracy was the last
thing that the Framers had in mind, and with good reason.
Term limits, a remedy proposed by some, are a bit more problematic. The imposition of mandatory turnover on elective offices
certainly tends to change things around, but it is not at all certain
that it would accomplish as much as the reshuffling brought about by
democratic electoral politics. The value of "shuffling," after all, is that
it is more or less random. The turnover created by term limits would
not be random at all. In addition, the term-limit remedy acts whether
it is needed or not. Turnover accomplished by electoral processes, on
the other hand, may be in part "random,' 5 but it may also stem-as I
think it has in the last couple of elections-from a widespread sense
on the part of voters that special interest parasitism has gotten out of
hand. Even if we do not feel that we can count on voters to engage in
the kind of day-to-day effort required to make plebiscitary democracy
work-something hard to expect in an age when we cannot get people
to show up for jury duty-perhaps we can count on them to know
when things have gotten too cozy, and to act appropriately. Certainly
the end of the Cold War has produced just such a sense, and just such
46
action, in quite a few democracies besides this one.
Indeed, a look at the constitutional system that the Framers
set up suggests that, as designed, it was rather well-equipped to take
advantage of the sex-like aspects of democracy in preventing parasitism. It was, after all, a representative democracy. There were only
two kinds of decisions that were to be made directly by the people:
the election of representatives, 47 and the election of delegates to conventions for the ratification (or proposal, in some cases) of

45. Or at least unpredictable.
46. See, for example, The Anti-Incumbent Tide Swamps Britain, U.S. News & World
Report 15, 15 (May 15, 1995) ("No specific issue explains the result. Instead, it reflects a general sense that the Tories have been in office too long and are out of touch"); Timothy Aeppel,
German Voters Turn to Right in State Poll, Wall St. J. A9 (March 8, 1993) ("The main message
of yesterday's election, however, was that voters are angry, particularly over the credibility of
established parties'; Change, ItalianStyle, N.Y. Times A14 (March 30, 1994) (describing Italian
voters' dissatisfaction with established parties and saying "[tihe rout of the main postwar
parties is close to complete"); Asterix le Gaulliste, 326 Economist 14 (March 27, 1993) (describing
French voters' unhappiness with existing politics). One caveat, however: Changes in party
must actually make a difference in who governs. At a sufficiently high level of special interest
control, elections no longer matter, because anyone who is elected will serve the same interest
groups. I suspect that many alienated voters believe this to be the state of affairs today,
although I do not share that belief. One obvious implication of my approach, however, is that
laws limiting the ability of voters to induce true change (such as laws that exclude third parties
or independent candidates from the ballot) should be disfavored.
47. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2.
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constitutional amendments. 48 Senators, in those pre-Seventeenth
Amendment days, were elected by state legislatures, while the
President (then as now) was elected by the Electoral College. Not a
single governmental decision was to be made by direct popular vote,
yet all decision-making institutions were open to unpredictable,
democratically induced change.
Since then, of course, the system has opened up somewhat.
Senators are now elected by the people. 49 Although Presidents are
still formally elected by the Electoral College, in practice the vote is
democratic, rather than collegial. 50 These changes would seem to
enhance the role of voter-induced turnover in promoting resistance to
special interests.51
Nonetheless, most people seem to agree that the power of
special interests has grown, particularly over the last fifty or sixty
years. According to Jonathan Rauch, interest-group domination took
off about the time of World War 11.52 Whereas the number of lobby

groups was about 400 in the late 1920s, by 1950 that number was
53
over 2,000, and today the number approaches 25,000.

Can we reconcile this expansion of parasitism with the argu54
ment that the basic structure of our Constitution is anti-parasitic?
It is, of course, possible to argue that things would be much worse
without the protections built into our system,55 or that other factors
are at work. There is, however, another explanation: we have
stopped living under the constitutional system described above.

48.

Id., Art. V.

49.

Id., Amend. XVII.

50. For a description of the current system, see David W. Abbott and James P. Levine,
Wrong Winner: The Coming Debacle in the Electoral College 16-19 (Praeger, 1991).
51. By noting this, I am not, of course, suggesting that the Framers had modern
evolutionary biology in mind. They did, however, set out to control the problem of special

interests, a kind of parasitism. The similarities between our Constitution's use of democracy
and organisms' use of sexual reproduction might therefore be considered examples of parallel
evolution.
52. Rauch, Demosclerosis at 38-44 (cited in note 5) (tracing the growth in membership of

various interest groups).
53. Id.
54. To avoid confusion, I stress that an "anti-parasitic" role for democracy is not the full
story any more than it is the full story with regard to sex. Democracy plays an important
communal role as well-for example, by making citizens feel (and be) part of the polity. My
discussion here focuses on the supposed vices of democracy and on how they may sometimes
actually be virtues. The other virtues of democracy are already well known.
55. Indeed, I make an argument of this sort in Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 Colum.
L. Rev. at 114-15 (cited in note 7).
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By this, I mean that the well-known changes in government
introduced since the New Deal era have substantially undermined the
protections against special interest dominance contained in the
Constitution. Although there are a number of ways in which this is
true, I will focus on two that are of key importance. First is the substantial expansion of federal authority brought about by the Supreme
Court's broad reading of the Commerce Clause in Wickard v.
5 6 From James Madison's notion of a federal government
Filburn.
whose powers are "few and defined, 57 the Wickard case brought us to
the proposition that there are few, if any, limits to congressional
power.5 8 Second is the Supreme Court's abandonment (in all but
name) of the anti-delegation doctrine, which prevented Congress from
ducking important questions (and the responsibility for important
decisions) by assigning them to administrative agencies, along with
the consequent growth in power of unelected bureaucrats. 9 Both
phenomena create the same problem: a growth in the power of
unelected officials to make decisions and an increased opportunity for
special interests to influence those decisions.
The growth of federal power under the Commerce Clause has
increased the role of special interests because it has made lobbying
the federal government vastly more attractive. A government that
can regulate wages attracts the attention of lobbyists for trade unions
and manufacturers; a government that can pass "crime" bills attracts
the attention of police unions, local governments, gun-control activists
and opponents, and so on. This should come as no surprise, but many
commentators have so far failed to make the connection. According to

56. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the enactment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
was within congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
57. As Madison wrote, "The powers delegated by the pr6posed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined." Federalist 45 (Madison) in Rossiter, The FederalistPapersat
292 (cited in note 29).
58. Wickard, as most readers will recall, was the case in which the Supreme Court held
that congressional power "to regulate Commerce... among the several States," U.S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, included the power to forbid a farmer to raise wheat for consumption on his own
farm by his own family and livestock. 317 U.S. at 124-28. Wickard and the cases that followed
it produced "a situation in which a standard law-student definition of the modern commerce
power is, 'Congress can do whatever it wants.'" Glenn H. Reynolds, Kids, Guns, and the
Commerce Clause, Policy Analysis No. 216 at 20 (October 10, 1994). The Supreme Court's
recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that the enactment of
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded congressional power under the Commerce
See text
Clause), has suggested that federal power may not be unlimited after all.
accompanying notes 66-76.
59. For a thorough and lucid discussion of this phenomenon and the problems it has
spawned, see David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the
People Through Delegation(Yale U., 1993).
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Rauch (and common sense), one reason why more special interests are
lobbying the federal government is that there is more money involved:
Like the bank robber Willie Sutton, Americans look for cash where the money
is.... Never before has organizing groups to lobby for benefits been as potenhave the sums available been as large or
tially lucrative as it is today; 6never
0
the paths to them as plentiful.

As Rauch notes, the federal budget was about three percent of the
American economy in 1929, and only about ten percent at the peak of
the New Deal. It is now nearly twenty-five percent. 61 With it raining
federal soup, it is no surprise that interest groups have rushed out
with buckets. Each new program, however, creates a new lobby:
Indeed, a built-in side effect of new government programs is their tendency to
summon into being new constituencies-which, in turn, often lobby for yet
other new programs, keeping the whole cycle going. Fifty
years ago the elderly
62
were a demographic category. Today they are a lobby.

The abandonment of commerce-clause limitations on federal
power has led to greater special interest pressure, in no small part,
because it has made the federal government more attractive to lobby.
But the problem goes beyond that. A federal government with more
powers and responsibilities is under increasing pressure to delegate
decision-making responsibility to the bureaucracy. Such delegation
moves decisionmaking from elected lawmakers, subject to the
electoral-turnover effects outlined above, to unelected bureaucrats (or
congressional staff) who are much more insulated from such effects.
The anti-delegation principle formerly prevented such moves, but
when the Supreme Court effectively stopped enforcing the doctrine
during the New Deal, that check was lost.
Thus, the reason the special-interest problem has grown worse
in our society in recent decades is that the safeguards that the
Framers put in place have largely been removed. Without those safeguards, it is no surprise that the tendencies they guarded against
have grown, any more than it is a surprise when someone whose immune system has been suppressed develops infections. In both cases,
parasites quickly appear to take advantage of the new opportunities
that open up. Also, in both cases the best hope for long-term survival
60.
61.

Rauch, Demosclerosis at 50, 54 (cited in note 5).
Id. at 54, 56.

62.

Id. at 57.
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is to reestablish the necessary immunity. In the political sphere, we
can do that by restoring the very constitutional safeguards whose
removal has led to the current problem.
VI. APPLYING THE THEORY: LOPEZ AND THORNTON
Two Supreme Court cases decided as this Essay was approaching publication are worth discussing, in light of the approach that has
been outlined. Although predicting Supreme Court decisions is a
chancy business, 6 3 a useful constitutional theory should provide a
means of evaluating Supreme Court decisions within its terms.
Though intended more as a source of understanding than of criticism,
this Essay's approach, which emphasizes the anti-parasitic role of
democracy in a system of representative government, turns out to
provide some useful insights into these cases. United States v.
Lopez, 64 the "Gun Free School Zones Act" case, dealt with
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. United States
Term Limits v. Thornton 5 involved the ability of states to apply term
limits to federal officials elected within their bounds.
Because criticism of Supreme Court decisions, rather than
praise of them, seems the surer path to academic success, I am disappointed to say that under the approach that I have outlined, the
Supreme Court appears to have gotten it right both times. That is,
the Court's endorsement of enumerated power limits on
Congressional action, and its rejection of term limits, both seem consistent with my approach.
The Lopez case involved a law, passed during Congress's biennial ritual of chest-thumping over crime, that forbade the possession
66
of a firearm within one thousand feet of a public or private school.
Passed (apparently) as an exercise of Congress's power to regulate
commerce among the states, the statute had little to do with crime,
and much to do with pleasing crime-related lobby groups and
enhancing Congress's prospects for reelection. Jeffrey Rosen of The
New Republic noted after the decision that "there is no uniquely
federal interest involved-except for the purely symbolic interest of

63. For further discussion of this topic, see Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 Colum. L.
Rev. at 113-14 (cited in note 7).
64.

115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).

65.

115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (finding unconstitutional state-imposed term limits on federal

representatives).
66. 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(1)(A) (1994 ed.).
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congressional
Democrats
and
Republicans
in
appearing
simultaneously tough on crime and tenderhearted on children. ' 7
Even symbolic legislation, however, has consequences in the
real world, and this legislation was no exception. Alfonso Lopez, a
twelfth-grader at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, was
caught with a revolver on school property. He was initially charged
under a Texas law, which (like that of most states) already forbade
the carrying of guns at school. Shortly thereafter, though, he was
charged under the federal law, and the state charges were dropped.68
Lopez's conviction was overturned by the Fifth Circuit on the
ground that the statute under which he was convicted was beyond the
enumerated powers of Congress.69 The original statute did not say
what power Congress was relying upon in passing the statute; in the
post-Wickard world such things appeared unnecessary.
Once
challenged, the government asserted that the statute represented an
exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce among the several
states.7 0 The government's argument, in brief, was that (1) the costs
of crime are spread across the nation through the mechanism of
insurance, so that crime affects interstate commerce, and that guns in
schools promote crime; (2) crime makes people less willing to travel,
and that guns in schools promote crime; and, most interestingly, (3)
the "national productivity" argument that guns in school promote
violence, violence promotes poor learning, poor learning produces an
under-educated work force, an under-educated work force produces a
less-productive economy, and a less-productive economy naturally
produces less commerce among the states. 1 Hence, by regulating the
possession of guns on school property, Congress was, in essence,
regulating commerce among the states.
The Court rejected this argument. Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that under our constitutional system,
the federal government is intended to be one of limited and enumerated powers. Under the government's formulation, however, he
stated that "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education."72 Thus,
the majority found that accepting the government's theory would
67.
68.
69.

Jeffrey Rosen, Fed Up, The New Republic 9, 13 (May 22, 1995).
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1995).

70.

Id.

71.
72.

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
Id.
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necessarily mean creating a federal government of general, rather
than limited powers, with no limits on its jurisdiction beyond those
73
imposed by the affirmative prohibitions of the Bill of Rights.
Four dissenters, led by Justice Breyer, disagreed, or at least
did not object to the creation of an essentially unlimited commerce
power.
In essence, the dissent agreed with the government's
"national productivity" argument that possession of guns in school is
bad for education, and that what is bad for education is bad for the
national economy. In the dissent's formulation, Congress's power to
regulate commerce among the states should be read as the power to
manage the national economy. According to the dissent:
Specifically, Congress could have found that gun-related violence near the
classroom poses a serious economic threat (1) to consequently inadequately
educated workers who must endure low paying jobs, and (2) to communities
and businesses that might (in today's "information society") otherwise
gain,
74
from a well-educated work force, an important commercial advantage.

Stressing "the immediacy of the connection between education and
the national economic well-being, ' 75 and implicitly interpreting
Congress's power to regulate commerce as a power to promote the
national economic well-being, the dissent would have upheld the
statute as a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce
76
among the states.
There is obviously much more to the case than this brief description can capture, and the law reviews will no doubt be full of
articles exploring all of its ramifications.7 7 For our purposes, however,
the question iswhether the approach that I have set out provides a
basis for choosing between the majority's view that Congress's power
to regulate commerce is limited essentially to commerce and those
things that have a substantial effect on commerce, and the dissent's
view that Congress's power is essentially limitless, reaching anything
that can plausibly be said to have a rational relationship to promoting
the national economic well-being78

73. Id. at 1634.
74. Id. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1662.
76. Id. at 1665.
77. For more on the Lopez case and its constitutional implications, see Reynolds, Kids,
Guns, and the Commerce Clause, Policy Analysis No. 216 at 20 (cited in note 58).
78. If this is so, one must wonder why the Framers bothered to include provisions like the
Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, or the Patent and Copyright Clause, id. Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8, both of which would rather obviously be subsumed under the sweeping power Justice
Breyer proclaims to exist. That question, however, is a topic for another article.
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As should be obvious, I believe that the majority opinion is
consistent with an approach informed by the role of special interest
parasitism and the ways in which our system of representative democracy is structured to resist such parasitism. The dissenting opinion, quite obviously, is not consistent with this approach. Under the
dissent's approach, there is no limit to the federal government's power
other than the Bill of Rights. Special interest groups are free to seek
the employment of governmental power in their own interest on any
subject, even if their interest is against the common good. Everything
is fair game; the only question is who has enough political clout.
Worse yet, this extensive federal power will be-will have to
be-exercised largely through an unelected bureaucracy that is insulated from the anti-parasitic effect of democracy, thereby deepening
the influence of special interests.
There are plenty of other reasons to doubt that the dissenting
opinion's approach is what the Constitution envisions, 79 but certainly
such an approach to federal power is inconsistent with an anti-parasitic view of constitutional structure. On the other hand, as I have
already suggested, a stricter adherence to enumerated limitations on
federal power would significantly increase the federal government's
resistance to special interests. The less lucrative the government is
as a source of wealth transfers and special treatment, the less people
will engage in parasitic efforts to gain such treatment.
The term limits case, United States Term Limits v. Thornton,
is a bit more difficult. Certainly the Court seems to have found it
difficult, notwithstanding the confident tone of both the majority
opinion and the dissent. Leaving aside the many issues certain to be
explored in countless law review articles, two points are worth looking
at from the anti-parasitic viewpoint. The first is the merit of term
limits as a guard against special interests. The second is the
79. Robert Bork, of course, has endorsed a similarly broad view of governmental power
with regard to areas involving sexuality: in essence, that government can regulate anything not
explicitly forbidden by the Bill of Rights. See Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica at 257-58 (cited in
note 33) (arguing that, without an explicit constitutional prohibition to rely upon, a court has no
principled means of distinguishing between valid and invalid legislation; it should, therefore,
defer to the legislature). As I have argued elsewhere, such a plenary view of governmental
power, even at the state level, is inconsistent with the Framers' views on the legitimate scope of
governmental authority and, hence, inconsistent with Bork's own claim to be pursuing an
"original understanding" approach. See Glenn H. Reynolds, Sex, Lies, and Jurisprudence:
Robert Bork, Griswold, and the Philosophy of Original Understanding,24 Ga. L. Rev. 1045
(1990). One might wonder if the term "conservative" means anything if it can be used to
describe both the Lopez majority opinion and Bork's rather radically statist jurisprudence, but
certainly it has been so used. That, however, is a topic for another article.
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difference between the majority opinion and the dissent regarding
who constitutes "the people" from a constitutional standpoint.
The first question has already been discussed. Viewed from
the perspective of the anti-parasitic role of democracy, term limits are
of doubtful utility in controlling special interest dominance, and they
may even make things worse.80 Ordinarily, this should be of no constitutional importance, since we do not generally require proof that
constitutional rights or powers "work." After all, there is no proof
that a free press or an armed populace protects against tyranny: the
First and Second Amendments are as much statements of faith as of
fact in that regard. Where the constitutional case is difficult, however, it is worth asking whether the program being advanced is consistent with the underlying character of the Constitution, and
whether it is likely to produce the outcomes that are being touted as a
justification for the change. The term limits approach fails this test.
It is inconsistent with other aspects of the anti-parasitic structure of
our system, and it is unlikely to produce the results claimed as the
reason for term limits in the first place. On this basis the term limits
remedy does not deserve to be cut any constitutional slack.
If the topic were term limits imposed at a national level, that
would be the end of it. But the term limits in Thornton were imposed
by a single state, Arkansas. This raises the more interesting question
that Akhil Amar has called the "denominator problem.81 In other
words, who are "the people!? Are they the people of the United States
as a whole (as the majority in Thornton argues), or are they the
distinct peoples of the several states, summed together on a state-bystate basis (as the dissent maintains)?
This is, of course, a question that has divided our nation for
some time, although I thought it had been pretty well answered by
the Civil War. At any rate, from an anti-parasitic viewpoint we might
ask which approach seems less likely to promote special interest
dominance. This question is worthy of considerable attention, which
fortunately it has received from none other than James Madison.
Madison wrote famously about the dangers of special interests, or
"faction," and the various approaches to controlling them, in The
Federalist No. 10.82 Madison argued that a representative government was less likely to be captured by factions than a pure democ-

80. See Part V.
81. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the DenominatorProblem, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749 (1994).
82. Federalist No. 10 (Madison) in Rossiter, The FederalistPapers(cited in note 29).
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racy. 83 Madison clearly also believed that under representative government a larger society was more resistant to special interest domination than a smaller one. According to Madison:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their
plans of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength and to act in unison with each other.8

Madison's view is consistent with everyday observation: small
schools are more cliquey, local governments more controlled by small
organized groups, and state legislatures more easily influenced. If we
conclude that one major point of our governmental system is resistance to special interests, the "denominator problem" seems best
answerable in national, rather than state terms. Thus, though the
opinion in Thornton properly rested on other grounds, it certainly
seems fair to say that the Court was right from an anti-parasitic
standpoint.
This may seem odd, since term limits are so often suggested as
a cure for special interest dominance. But while there is certainly a
problem with excessive special interest power, that does not mean
that just any purported cure is a good idea. Term limits-particularly
term limits imposed on federal officials by states-are both unlikely to
work and inconsistent with the underlying principle. At best, they
represent an effort to treat the symptoms of a much deeper problem-departure from the basic structure of the Constitution-that can

83. Madison stated:
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the
delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the
rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which
the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views.... Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good
than i pronounced by the people themselves.
Id. at 82.
84. Id. at 83.
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only be remedied by a much deeper solution, that of returning to the
basic structure.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Essay I have argued that democracy is like sex, insofar
as electoral turnover, properly structured, can help limit the influence
of special interests in much the same fashion that sex is believed to
reduce the viability of parasites. I have further suggested that our
constitutional system was originally structured in a manner that took
advantage of these "anti-parasitic" characteristics of democracy, but
that the expansion of federal authority under the Commerce Clause
and the demise of the non-delegation doctrine have undermined that
effect. I have argued that many current proposals to reduce the increased influence of special interests by making the system "more
democratic" may actually make things worse. Instead, I have suggested that a revival of the doctrines of enumerated powers and nondelegation is likely to do more to reduce special interest dominance,
with less risk of doing serious damage to the constitutional structure
than these more popular proposals for "reform."
I have thus come a long way in this short paper to arrive at a
rather straightforward suggestion: that we pay attention to the
Constitution. That such a suggestion is radical-and I fear that it
is-is a poor reflection on the state of constitutional discourse at the
moment, but that is a topic for another paper. I do believe, at any
rate, that I have provided a fairly clear reason (not simply an "It is
written" argument) for doing so. Aside from providing a catchy title,
the biological analogy I have chosen illustrates how our constitutional
system can answer a problem that occupies much contemporary attention, without requiring major surgery.
If we are seriously concerned about the growth of special interest power, and the widespread demands for term limits and similar
constitutional reforms would certainly suggest that we are, then we
might consider the radical approach of actually doing what the
Constitution commands. For the reasons already outlined, I think
that we could do far more to restrain the influence of special interest
parasites by taking seriously existing constitutional limitations such
as enumerated powers and the anti-delegation doctrine than by
adopting any of the slapdash proposals for constitutional reform that
currently clutter the airwaves on the political talking-head circuit.
And the risks of such an approach would probably be fewer. After all,
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we lived under such limits for the first three quarters of our nation's
existence without disaster. We can probably do so again.
Despite my catchy title, such a proposal lacks the "sex appeal"
of flashy new solutions based on the Information Superhighway, or on
major constitutional change. Against this deficiency, I can only suggest one virtue: it will probably work.
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